Using a simple version of the model for the quantum measurement of a two level system, the contention of Aharonov, Anandan, and Vaidman that one must in certain circumstances give the wavefunction an ontological as well as an epistemological significance is examined. I decide that their argument that the wave function of a system can be measured on a single system fails to establish the key point and that what they demonstrate is the ontological significance of certain operators in the theory, with the wave function playing its usual epistemological role.
Aharonov, Anandan, and Vaidman [1] have recently argued that in addition to its usual epistemological role, the wave function in quantum mechanics in certain situations also has an ontological role. In other words, in addition to acting as a device in the theory to encode the conditions (our knowledge of the world) it must also, in certain circumstances, be regarded as real, in the sense that one can completely determine an unknown wavefunction of a single system. Certainly if their claim were true, that one could take a single system with an unknown wavefunction, and completely determine that wave function on that single system, one would have to accord the wave function a reality on the grounds that that which is measurable is real. In the course of this paper I will argue that they have failed to establish the measurability of the wave function, and thus have failed in their attempt to demonstrate the reality of the wave function. The argument is however subtle. Thus the plan of this paper will be to first discuss the problem of reality in quantum mechanics, to set stage for the question that they are trying to answer.
I will then go through their argument in some detail for a simple system which will I hope clarify their argument. In particular I hope it will clarify the key term in their paper, namely "protection". I will finally argue that they have failed to establish a key requirement of their argument. To use their term, I will argue that "protection" is not an active attribute, in that one cannot protect a wave function. Rather protection is an attribute that a system can have, and that the wave function will play its usual epistemological role in stating the condition that the system has that property. It is in their failure to establish the active, rather than the passive sense of protection that I feel their argument fails.
Quantum mechanics is a strange theory which even today, seventy years after its invention/discovery, causes immense difficulties to students and physicists alike. In particular, many find it difficult to establish a reliable quantum picture of reality. Physicists are wedded to the proposition that their field of study is one concerned with reality, that their mathematical formalism is an accurate model of something which exists in the outside world, and is not simply a free invention of the human mind.
In classical physics the relation between the mathematical theory and reality is relatively direct. The terms in the theory correspond in a relatively direct way with physical reality. The dynamical variables in the theory can be assigned values, and so can the attributes of objects in the world. The assigning of values to attributes of the real world in the process of measurement can be modeled directly in the assigning of values to the variables in the theory. The variables in the theory can therefore be taken as having a direct correspondence with the attributes in the world.
Quantum mechanics on the other hand does not behave in such a neat manner. There seems to be no direct correspondence between the structures in the theory and the attributes of the real world. It is this more than anything else which has lead to the widespread unease with quantum mechanics as an ultimate theory of nature. There are two separate structures in quantum mechanics, the operators on some Hilbert space, and the vectors which live in that Hilbert space. Both of these mathematical structures play a role in the theory, but how do they relate to the structure of the physical world?
The operators represent the dynamical variables, and thus correspond in the most direct way to the attributes of the physical world. However, one cannot simply ascribe a number to an operator. The correspondence between the values that we know physical attributes can have, and the assigning of values to the operators is far less straightforward than in classical physics. The values of the operators are its eigenvalues, and one can assign a value to an operator only when it is operating on special vectors in Hilbert space, namely the eigenvectors. Furthermore the various operators cannot all simultaneously have values. This feature of quantum theory is of course well known. The state vector, or wave function thus tells us which of the various operators and thus which of the physical attributes can be assigned a definite value. It furthermore plays the mysterious role of assigning probabilities to the various values that other dynamical variables can have. It thus plays an epistemological role in representing our knowledge about the system under consideration.
But what role does it play in physical reality? Is there some aspect of the physical world which corresponds to the wave function, some extra aspect of the world separate from the dynamic variables, or is it an ideal element of the theory, with no physical reality in its own right, and existing solely in the theory to represent our knowledge of the actual state of the physical world? Is the the wave function real or is it simply a device within the theory to incorporate our knowledge of the world, without it in itself corresponding to anything in the real world? In the former case it would have an ontological role, while in the latter a purely epistemological role.
That physicists have long wanted to regard the wave function as having an ontological role is clear. That desire underlies the unease surrounding the "projection postulate", and the oft heard lament that the wave function cannot simultaneously obey deterministic dynamical equations of evolution, and indeterministic collapse in the ill defined "measurement" process.
As an object with an ontological role, as an object corresponding to some element of physical reality such schizophrenic behaviour is highly unsatisfactory. On the other hand if the wave function is simply a tool by which we encode our knowledge into the theory, the change of the wavefunction under a change in knowledge is perfectly rational. It leaves one, however with uncomfortable questions about how knowledge differs from other physical processes.
AAV try to answer the question about the reality of the wave function by asking whether or not the wave function is measurable. If not just the dynamic variables, but the wave function itself can be measured, then the wave function must correspond to an aspect of reality, must have an ontological as well as an epistomelogical aspect within the theory. Thus the question they ask is whether one can start with a single system and on that system determine what its wave function is? For example, if one can determine the expectation value of a sufficiently large number of operators, one can determine the wave function. Now, the expectation value can be determined if we start with a sufficiently large ensemble of systems, all in the same state. But this would at best give the wave function a role in ensembles, not in single systems.
To give it a true ontological meaning, one would like the wave function to have a physical significance, to be measurable, on a single system. Thus the question is "Can one take a system in some initial unknown state and completely determine that state by a sequence of measurements on that single system?" If one can, then one would be forced to the position that the the wave function of a single system is measurable and that the wave function therefor was a real attribute of that single system. This is what AAV claim. What they show however, is that, if the wavefunction is known beforehand to be the eigenstate of the unknown Hamiltonian of that system then it is possible to determine the properties of that eigenstate. What their analysis shows is that one can determine some of the properties of an unknown Hamiltonian on a single system, if one knows that the system is in an eigenstate of that operator.
Let us therefor analyze the AAV contention that such a measurement is possible under certain conditions. To do so, I will concentrate on a specific, simple, system, namely a two level (spin 1 2 ) system. Can one determine what the wave function of such a system is on a single exemplar of that system? AAV claim the answer to be yes, if one can , to use their word, protect the wave function.
The difficulty with the usual measurement procedure is that the wave function in general changes as the result of measurements. In the view of measurement as a primitive of the theory, this change is just the projection postulate, the reduction of the wave function. In the view of measurement as a physical process, it is the result of the interaction of the measuring apparatus with the system being measured. Thus after a single measurement, the system is no longer in the state it began with, and there is no way in which one can recover that original state. Furthermore a single measurement of any time is not sufficient to determine the state of the system. However, they argue that if one can "protect" the wave function, ie interact with the system in such a way that its wave function remains unchanged after the measurement, but still affects the measuring apparatus, that then one can make a succession of such measurements on the system, and finally completely determine its wave function.
The key to their "protection" was to realize that if a system is in an energy eigenstate, and if the interaction between the system and the rest of the world was adiabatic, that then the wave function after the measurement would still be that same energy eigenstate. The wave function would not have changed even though the system would have interacted with the rest of the world, and even though its interaction could have changed that outside world in a manner that depended on the specific state that the system was in. Thus one could measure the system ( ie determine its effect on the outside world, and thus the state it was in) without changing the wave function of the system. This allows one to make repeated measurements on the system, and completely determine the state of the system.
To make these ideas clear, let us use a simple two level system as our system of interest. It is assumed to be in some pure state |ψ 0 . Now, for a two level system any pure state can be represented by a three dimensional vector ρ, such that P =
Let us now assume that we can arrange that this system has H 0 = P as its bare Hamiltonian. This is the crucial assumption. It is exactly this condition which is the condition of "protection" introduced by AAV.
Our measuring apparatus will be a free, infinitely massive particle. The "infinitely massive" assumption is made so that the the p 2 /2m free Hamiltonian for the measuring apparatus can be neglected. The coupling to to the measuring apparatus will be via an interaction of the form
where L is a known matrix, and x is the position operator of the particle. ǫ(t) is a time dependent coupling which is assumed to be slowly varying. The full Hamiltonian for the system is then given by
Now, the Schroedinger equation is simply solved for this Hamiltonian. The position x is a constant of the motion, so that we can expand the states of the apparatus in eigenstates of the position, |x . The Schroedinger equation for the system plus apparatus, with the apparatus in an eigenstate of position, is then
where the full wave function for the system plus apparatus is given by
The largest instantaneous eigenvalue of this operator on the right of this reduced Schroedinger equation is given by
and the projection operator onto this eigenvector |E(t) is given by
By the adiabatic theorem, the state of the system will evolve as the eigenvector of this projection operator, which I will label by |E(t) >. This will be true as long as the direction of the unit vectorn
does not change rapidly in time. (|ṅ| ≪ E(t)). If this approximation is valid, then
where |φ 0 is the initial state of the measuring apparatus. Now, let us assume that the the values of x for which the amplitude for the measuring apparatus is non zero are small (i.e., φ(x) = 0 for large x). We can then write
Retaining the first term, and looking at the system after ǫ(t) has dropped back to zero again, we find that
But the exponential is just the momentum space displacement operator. Thus if the original measuring apparatus had a wave function of the form φ( p) = p|φ , the state of the measuring apparatus after the measurement is φ( p + ǫL · ρ). The momentum of the measuring apparatus has been displaced by an amount just proportional to L · ρ, and the wave function of the system plus apparatus after the measurement is a product state with the system still in its original state. Now, we can write L · ρ as
since in the assumed initial state, ρ = ψ| σ|ψ . and we have that the measuring apparatus has responded to the expectation value of an operator in the state of the system. By making a sufficient number measurements on the system, with various values of L, one can therefor completely determine ρ and therefor the original wave function for the system. Because the final state of the system is identical with the initial state, one is furthermore able to make as many measurements as one desires, with as many different measuring apparatuses and as many different L as desired. An interesting but not significant fact about the specific example analyzed here is that if we take L to be the identity matrix (or any other nonsingular matrix), a single measurement of the change of the momentum of the apparatus will give us, to within some error determined by the spread of the initial momentum of the apparatus, the value of ρ. Thus , their argument in a nutshell is, that by protecting the wave function, ie, choosing the free Hamiltonian of the system so that the initial state of the system is an eigenfunction of the Hamiltonian, and thus protecting it, the wave function can be determined and measured on a single system ( and in this case, with a single measurement). The crucial step is the protection postulate. Can a wave function be protected or is it rather a feature that the wave function has, like being the eigenstate of some operator. Is one measuring the wave function in the above procedure, or is one measuring one of the dynamic variables of the system. for example, it is well known that one can measure various properties of a single system. In particular, one can measure the properties of the Hamiltonian of a single system. The detailed Hamiltonian of a single atom enclosed within a Penning trap for example can be measured with arbitrary accuracy on that single system. The crucial point about the measurement of the wave function is whether or not one can measure an arbitrary wave function of a given system, and this they fail to show. In the above example, the arbitrariness of the wavefunction was encoded in the arbitrariness of the vector ρ. The assumption was made that the Hamiltonian of the system had the same vector ρ as did the wave function. If one could take an arbitrary wave function and without knowing what that wave function was, one could choose the Hamiltonian for the system so that it was given by that same ρ, then one could genuinely say that one had measured the wavefunction by the above technique. However, the situation we have is that the Hamiltonian for the system is given by some unknown ρ, and we can choose the state so that it is described by the same ρ, ie is an eigenfunction of that same Hamiltonian.
One may be able to ensure that the particle is in the eigenstate of the unknown Hamiltonian (although one's ability to do even this may be questionable, especially if the state in question is not the ground state of that unknown Hamiltonian), but one cannot ensure that the Hamiltonian has the given but unknown state as its eigenstate. To do the latter, to take the system in an unknown state, and to then choose a Hamiltonian for the system so that that unknown state is its eigenstate would mean that the equation of evolution of the wave function would be non-linear. The Hamiltonian driving the evolution would be a function of the initial state of the system. If we could carry out that procedure for our example, in the Schroedinger representation, one would have
Because the Hamiltonian depends on the wave function itself, the evolution is no longer a linear evolution, but is highly non-linear. Instead one has
where ρ 0 is some constant independent of ψ. This point lies at the heart of their paper. If one comes upon the system after the initial selections have been made, one could say that all one has is a state and a Hamiltonian. Both are unknown, but it is known that the state is an eigenstate of the Hamiltonian. What does it matter how they got that way? What does it matter whether the physicists began with an unknown Hamiltonian and forced the system to be in an eigenstate of the hamiltonian, or one started with an unknown state, and chose the Hamiltonian so be the projection operator onto that state say? The end result is identical. However, if one is to regard the wave function as real, as having an ontological significance for that single system, the two are crucially different. We can force the wave function to be an eigenstate of an operator, we cannot force the operator to have the unknown wavefunction as its eigenstate. It is precisely the impossibility of the latter that leads to the conclusion that the wave function is not real, does not have the necessary permanence and independence to be considered as real.
What happens if we present their system with the spin half system in a truly unknown state? The system has some (unknown) Hamiltonian, which we cannot force to have the unknown state as its eigenstate. Thus the bare Hamiltonian is given by
where ρ 0 is unknown but is not equal to ρ =< ψ| σ|ψ >. Given this as the Hamiltonian for the system, and given the same coupling to the apparatus, one finds that the initial wave function for the system will be
where cos(θ/2) = ρ · ρ 0 and the phase of |− has chosen appropriately ( it will not enter into the following analysis). |+ , |− are the eigenstates of ρ 0 · σ After the interaction, the final wave function is given by
If ǫdtL · ρ 0 is sufficiently large and the wave function φ( p) sufficiently peaked, then a measurement of p after the interaction will tell one that the system was in the |+ state with probability cos 2 (θ) and in the |− state with probability sin 2 (θ). Ie, the measurement envisaged by AAV leads to the standard result that the measurement gives us one of the two possible outcomes for the polarisation of the spin half system along the direction of ρ 0 with the usual probabilities. Their protected measurements are simply another form of the standard quantum measurement theory. They measure the polarisation of the particle along the direction of the (possibly unknown) direction ρ 0 .
Note that this measurement procedure is somewhat different from the standard von Neumann analysis of the measurement process. There the measurement is of the operator of the system which couples the measuring apparatus to system. In this problem that would be the vector operator L · σ. Rather the measurement is one of the free Hamiltonian of the system, H 0 . But such situations were already well known from the standard analysis of the Stern Gerlach experiment in which the particle is measured to be in the eigenstates of spin along the constant magnetic field ( which does not couple to the translational degrees of freedom of the particle) rather than the spin along the direction of the inhomogeneous field, which does couple to the translational degrees of freedom by applying a force to the particle. In fact as the above analysis makes clear, our system and measuring apparatus of the standard Stern Gerlach experiment [2] , with L just the matrix ∇ B, and the measuring apparatus being the translational degrees of freedom of the particle.
I commented that the deflection of the measuring apparatus was proportional to L · ρ, which could be written as the expectation value of the operator L· σ in the special "protected" state. This is one of the key points which led AAV to conclude that this process can be considered to be a measurement of the state of the system. However, the change in momentum of the apparatus can also be written as being proportional to T rH 0 L · σ. In fact when we choose the state to be different from the eigenstate of the Hamiltonian, we realize that this is a better expression for the deflection, because it applies for an arbitrary initial state. The deflection remains the same regardless of the state of the system, as long as H 0 remains the same. Thus, one would be more accurate to regard the the deflection is a property not of the state of the system, but of the dynamic operators which define the system and the measuring apparatus. One is not measuring a property of the state of the system, namely the expectation value of some operators. Rather one is measuring properties of the dynamical operators. It is they, not the wave function which have ontological property. The wave function, in their analysis, plays its usual epistemological role in telling us that we are in an eigenstate, that the system has a certain definite energy. Just because we do not happen to know exactly what the Hamiltonian is that the system is in the eigenstate of, does not give the wave function any ontological property that it would not have if we knew what the Hamiltonian was.
Thus, I have shown that the analysis of AAV is crucially flawed in demonstrating the reality of the wavefunction. If a system has an unknown Hamiltonian, and if one knows that the state of the system is in an eigenstate of that unknown Hamiltonian (ie, the wave function plays its usual epistemological role in designating knowledge we have about the system), then one can determine that eigenstate-ie that property of the unknown Hamiltonian-on that single system. However, if the system is in a completely unknown state, then they have not demonstrated that they can protect that state, and there is no measurement or sequence of measurements which will tell us what that state is. I.e., an unknown state is not measurable, and thus is not real or ontological.
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